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THE FUTURE AT A GLANCE 
What does 
the future 
hold for the 
Black 
Country? 
This report is designed to stimulate thinking, extend conversations and inform 
actions as to how the future could and should be shaped. 
Megatrends are large, transformative global forces that are considered to 
endure over the medium and long-term (30-100 years). 
Reviewing the social, technological, economic, environmental and political 
megatrends that are projected to have far-reaching impacts on the Black 
Country is a step towards identifying and addressing the opportunities and 
challenges of the future. 
Based on these projections it is anticipated that the future of the Black 
Country will be characterised by 3Cs. 
Diverging demographic trends and growing inequalities will mean stark 
differences in what the future holds and how it is experienced both within 
and across nation states and regions. 
Contrasts 
The costs and benefits of globalisation will become increasingly visible and 
debates on the performance and legitimacy of existing social, political and 
economic relations will become more vital. 
Connections 
Relations between people, technology and the environment will be 
become more important and complex.  Extended work and social 
networks have the potential to play a vital role in addressing a number of 
global and local challenges. 
A growth in interconnectivity may also lead to more surveillance and 
disruption from the risks posed by climate change and political 
instability. 
Increases in global population and incomes will lead to increased 
consumption and competition over access to resources. 
Contests A competition for resources, in a multi-polar world, is expected to heighten 
differences within and across countries and make efforts to create and 
sustain shared understandings and goals more difficult to achieve. 
Next 
Steps 
To extend and deepen discussions within and across institutions and communities, as 
to how to respond to these megatrends and create and shape possible and preferred 
futures for all in the Black Country. 
 FOREWORD 
 
Planning for the future has always been a key component of any successful society and 
economy. Without foresight and analysis to base decision making on we can be overtaken 
by events and current levels of activity may well suffer. This report looks at issues facing 
the Black Country in the future and seeks to assist our future planning through the 
projections it highlights. For example by 2040 it models a major increase in the number of 
devices that individuals have. Technology may of course, come up with different solutions 
but it is clear that society’s reliance on the current type of SMART technology has simply 
whetted our appetite and expectation for more. This report quite rightly does not come up 
with solutions. It simply seeks to use the technique of looking at megatrends to paint a 
picture. This picture and the landscape may change but what megatrends do is to help to 
prepare for change and development. A key role of universities is to use its knowledge base 
to help to create the tools to maximise planning. Megatrends are a key aspect of such a 
framework and this report provides an insightful approach. 
 
I commend the report to you and know it will be a key part of our futureproofing.  
 
Geoff Layer 
Vice Chancellor 
University of Wolverhampton 
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The point of writing about the future is not 
to predict it. I'm not pretending to be 
Nostradamus. The point of such writing is 
to influence the present by extrapolating 
current trends for advancement or 
detriment. Nobody is good at prediction. If 
we were better at guessing events in a year 
or even a few months or weeks, our divorce 
rate would be zero, we would not get into 
stupid relationships and nobody would lose 
money on the stock market or the 
racetrack. The point of creating futures is 
to get people to imagine what they want 
and don't want to happen down the road 
and maybe do something about it. 
Marge Piercy
1
 
 
 
The report, ‘Global Megatrends and the Black 
Country’ is intended to support and inform 
ongoing strategic conversations within and between 
institutions, communities and individuals, across 
the Black Country and beyond. This report 
provides a review of some of the latest data, trends 
and thinking on global megatrends. Megatrends 
occur at the intersection of many trends and 
represent projected changes in social, political and 
economic relations. Megatrends have the potential 
to significantly change the way people live. 
Therefore attempts to anticipate megatrends 
enable foresight into the risk, rewards and 
responsibilities that the future may hold. The 
scope of the report is global and as such seeks to 
extend both the temporal and spatial boundaries of 
what are considered opportunities, challenges and 
responsibilities for those living in the Black 
Country today. There is no one way to respond to 
the data and tendencies highlighted in this report, 
but it is argued that a response is necessary. The 
report does not predict the future, but represents a 
set of projections intended to stimulate thinking, 
extend conversations and inform actions as to how 
the future of the Black Country could and should 
be shaped. 
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 THE FUTURE IN 10 
MINUTES 
1.1. This report on megatrends highlights the global 
conditions, relations and practices that the Black 
Country will need to negotiate in the medium and 
long term. Every day individuals, groups, 
institutions and governments anticipate and act 
towards the future. The Dial 481 project aims to 
build on and extend such everyday sense making in 
order to inform and support future debates, policies 
and practices. Reporting on megatrends is not an 
exercise in predicting the future, but an attempt to 
consider the possible outcomes of current practices 
and to anticipate potential opportunities and 
challenges. The task is not to know the future, but 
to anticipate and act towards the futures of the 
Black Country. 
 
Society 
In 2050 the world’s population will be larger, more 
urban and older than today.  Change will progress 
unevenly across regions.  Diverging trends will 
present different challenges to different regions. 
Significant changes in labour and social welfare 
patterns are expected. Relatively low income 
countries will be faced with demands to provide 
infrastructure and opportunities for their young and 
growing populations. Relatively high income 
countries, faced with increasing age dependency 
ratios, will need to consider the sustainability of 
existing systems of production and care, but also 
the relationship that could and should exist between 
the production and reproduction of society. 
 
Technology 
Innovations in technology are expected to be a 
disruptive force in social, political and economic 
relations. A fourth industrial revolution, that 
redraws the lines between physical, digital, and 
biological domains, is anticipated. Technology is 
likely to develop in advance of policies and 
regulations. The risks and rewards of technology 
are unlikely to be spread evenly unless anticipatory 
action is taken. The role that technologies can and 
should play in society is yet to be determined. 
Public debates and conflict over the uses and 
abuses of technology and how best to respond to 
new risks and opportunities are likely to be 
heightened as the scope and potential of technology 
increases. 
 
Economy 
Asia is set to become the world’s economic centre 
of gravity, in what is projected to be a rebalancing 
of global economies. Economic growth is projected 
to help achieve reductions in global poverty, but 
based on current trends, will also be linked to 
growing inequality and escalating environmental 
pressures. The costs and benefits of globalisation 
will become increasingly visible, but given the 
uneven distribution of the benefits of globalisation, 
opposition will become more vocal. It is anticipated 
that industrial revolution 4.0 will disrupt existing 
relations and potentially provide, and or require, 
different routes and ideas of progress. 
 
Environment 
It is projected that climate change and an increased 
demand and competition for resources will place 
increasing pressure on the planet's ecosystems. 
Tensions over climate change will grow as extreme 
weather, soil stress, and food and water insecurity 
disrupt societies. Changes in the environment have 
the potential to slow economic growth and pose a 
risk to human welfare and security. Limiting and 
mitigating the risks resulting from climate change 
will require substantial and sustained reductions in 
greenhouse gas emissions and the development of 
sustainable solutions to increased demands on the 
planet's resources. 
 
Politics 
Governing will get harder. The emergence of a 
multipolar geopolitical landscape will complicate 
efforts to secure multilateral agreements. A shift in 
global politics may be overshadowed by a more 
fundamental shift in the nature of power. Enabled 
by communication technologies, power will shift 
toward extended, resourceful and diffuse networks. 
Securing and sustaining agreement on global, 
national and regional issues will require a rethink 
on the nature and exercise of power and 
accountability. For those seeking to develop and 
enact strategies, difficulties in setting and 
communicating agreed narratives around a common 
interest, will further complicate the realisation of 
such strategies. Networks and coalitions will 
become increasingly vital in a multipolar world. 
 
Next Steps 
In sum, it is anticipated that the future of the Black 
Country can be characterised by 3Cs - Contrasts, 
Connections and Contests. Broadly, when faced 
with change, agents can choose one of three broad 
positions, to be fatalistic, adaptable or 
transformative. The choice of orientation will in 
part depend on the values, beliefs and capacity of 
the agents concerned. When considering futures, 
the question is posed, under what conditions will it 
be possible for all people to have the opportunity to 
realise their futures in the Black Country?   
 THE FUTURE IN AN 
HOUR 
2.1. Why bother with the future? Well hopefully we 
will all have one. It is the future where we will be 
spending the rest of our lives. Our dreams, plans, 
hopes and fears, may be shaped by our histories 
and present concerns, but they will all play out and 
be realised in our futures. Beyond such truisms, 
there are particular reasons to attend to potential 
futures.  
 
Human Futurity 
2.2. To be human is to be future oriented
2
. As 
individuals or institutions, the capacity to imagine, 
speculate, anticipate, and plan provides everyday 
evidence of our futurity. A desire to know the 
future takes many distinct forms. Throughout 
history, oracles have claimed to divine prophecies 
and revelations in order to forewarn and provide 
guidance
3
. Today the somewhat paradox notion that 
the future can be both known, but created, informs 
the approach of those organisations seeking to 
know the future today
4
. 
 
Structural Irresponsibility 
2.3. In the same way that today is a legacy of past 
social, political, economic and technical 
developments, so too will the actions taken today 
shape the future. The modern age is marked by 
practices that have far reaching intended and 
unintended consequences. And yet, the capacity 
and potential legacies of today’s practices and 
policies is not necessarily matched by a widespread 
willingness or ability to consider the consequences 
of these decisions and actions.  
 
Neglecting the future places a structural 
irresponsibility at the very core of policy making, 
and raises questions regarding the temporal 
jurisdiction of the decisions taken today. If a 
responsibility for the present is to be considered 
alongside future responsibilities there is a 
requirement to call futures to mind and mind the 
future
5
. Efforts are being made in this regard. A 
number of public and private institutions have been 
studying global megatrends, not only to enhance 
their performance and longevity, but to identify 
what responsibilities they have to future 
generations
6
. 
 
Contested Futures  
2.4. The future is contested. The future is a domain 
where both claims over what the future will be and 
the decisions and actions that this future requires 
are subject to conflict. Appeals to a better 
tomorrow, or the fear of what is to come, can serve 
as means by which policy makers attempt to justify 
actions to be taken today
7
. This is not necessarily a 
problem if both the future and the space for making 
claims on the future remain open. However, politics 
and policy making is imbued with efforts to define 
what is feasible by occupying the future.  
 
Claims to foretell and know the future can wield 
significant influence over what is deemed a realistic 
future and therefore what are considered feasible 
actions and decisions to be taken today
8
. However, 
there are no future facts
9
. At best there are 
probabilities and tendencies and even these become 
less clear beyond the short term.  
 
Claims to know the future are to be treated with 
some caution. Not only are such forecasts more 
likely to project the assumptions and interests of 
today, but more fundamentally, suggest a closed 
rather than open future
10
. Where the individual and 
collective choices that people make, intended or 
otherwise, are a vital factor in shaping outcomes, it 
is not possible to posit a closed system where all 
variables can be known and outcomes 
predetermined
11
. People can and do respond to 
projected changes in order to create different 
conditions, relations and practices. 
 
So Why Bother? 
2.5. Attending to futures quickly reveals a tension. 
At a time when the long term legacy of current 
practices is pronounced and far reaching, not only 
does the appetite for a long term perspective appear 
limited, but claims to know the future appears 
misplaced.   
 
However, rather divine the future, the task is to be 
future minded
12
. To be future minded is to extend 
the horizon of what the future could be, to analyse 
the present in order to identify points of 
intervention and possibilities for action and to give 
due consideration to balancing current and future 
responsibilities
13
.  
 
A preoccupation with current events and concerns 
can limit efforts to think creatively about the future. 
Attempts to envision the future are further 
complicated by unexamined assumptions that are 
held regarding what is a desirable future, how 
society works and the means by which changes can 
be made to create a particular future. Foresight is 
an approach designed to address these issues and 
anticipate and act towards possible futures. 
 
 Foresight 
2.6. A range of approaches and tools are available 
to support engagement with futures
14
. Foresight 
refers to those approaches that attempt to anticipate 
the opportunities and threats that may arise in mid- 
to long- term versions of the future. Every day 
individuals, groups, institutions and governments 
anticipate and act towards the future.  
 
The Dial 481 project aims to build on and extend 
such everyday sense making in order to inform and 
support future debates, policies and practices. 
Foresight provides decision makers with extended 
horizons for what is possible and how these 
possibilities can be realised. More specifically, 
foresight can support decision makers identify if 
and how they need to adapt to new contexts OR 
seek to transform the environment in which they 
operate. 
 
The Dial 481 Project 
2.7. The Dial 481 project uses EVE, a framework 
designed to Explore, View and Educe futures.  
 
EXPLORE - A key challenge when thinking about 
futures is the sheer volume of sources and 
information available. The Dial 481 project reviews 
and helps make sense of latest data and reports on 
the most important issues, trends and tendencies.   
 
VIEW – The Dial 481 project helps people view 
the implications of their futures and the 
assumptions and interests that inform particular 
views of the future. A range of methods are used to 
enhance an understanding of change and the 
mechanisms underlying events and the shaping of 
futures.  
 
EDUCE - Anticipating possible futures and 
identifying and prioritising potential challenges and 
opportunities are essential to informed and 
effective decision making. The Dial 481 project 
uses futures to design and test prototype policies 
and practices in order to inform the development 
and implementation of strategies that anticipate and 
realise preferred futures. 
 
The Dial 481 project brings future orientated 
approaches to life on real projects and further 
develops the capacity of individuals, groups and 
institutions to anticipate and realise their futures as 
part of an everyday practice. 
 
This report represents the first phase and function 
of the foresight process. That is, to explore futures, 
to inform a strategic conversation as to how best to 
anticipate and prepare for the challenges and 
opportunities of the future. This is a conversation 
and strategy that will evolve as new information on 
the possibilities the future may hold develops. This 
is not just an exercise in extending the number of 
years over which an agent considers its future, but 
also one that supports agents to make sense of a 
complex, changing and uncertain environment and 
future. 
 
Black Country 
2.8. There remains some dispute over the origins of 
the name and it boundaries, but what is not in doubt 
is that the Black Country has shaped and been 
shaped by a series of social, political and economic 
transformations. 
 
The Black Country includes the Boroughs of 
Dudley, Sandwell, Walsall and Wolverhampton 
and covers 356 square kilometres. Home to over 
1.1m people and 440,000 households, 15% of the 
people living in the Black Country are from Black 
and Minority Ethnic (BME) origins, compared to a 
national average of 9%. Levels of deprivation and 
children living in poverty are generally higher than 
the average for England
15
.  
 
The Black Country is a polycentric region. Each of 
the Black Country’s boroughs includes a number of 
historically distinct towns and villages, with ready 
access to the national road and rail network. The 
Black Country helps constitute the West Midlands 
Combined Authority, making up four of the 
eighteen local authorities and one of the four Local 
Enterprise Partnerships.  
 
Shaped by its industrial past, in the 19th century, 
the Black Country was one of the most heavily 
industrialised areas in the world. During the course 
of the 20th century, the Black Country, together 
with Birmingham and Coventry, constituted a vital 
part of the UK's manufacturing economy and host 
to a number of globally known companies. In the 
21
st
 Century, manufacturing remains a vital part of 
the local and national economy with over 18% of 
all jobs still in this sector compared with 11% 
nationally. 
 
The Black Country’s distinct and significant 
heritage continues to shape the present, but what 
about the Black Country’s future? What risks and 
opportunities does the future hold for the Black 
Country and how can anticipating futures, 
alongside appreciating the past, inform what the 
people who live, work and play in the Black 
Country do today.  
 Megatrends 
2.9. Megatrends are large, transformative global 
forces that are considered to endure over a long 
period of time, from 30 years up to 100 years. 
Megatrends are considered to have far-reaching 
impacts on politics, business, culture, economies 
and individuals.  
 
A number of state, for profit and not for profit 
organisations produce reports on megatrends
16
. For 
the purposes of this report the megatrends 
identified are organised within what is described as 
a STEEP framework. 
 
• Social – demographic and cultural characteristics. 
• Technological – tools and relations for 
completing tasks. 
• Economic - levels of growth, relations of 
production, consumption and distribution. 
• Environmental - environmental conditions and 
levels of resource and pollution. 
• Political – forms of governance, prominent and 
or contested ideologies, and sources of power. 
 
Reporting on megatrends is not an exercise in 
predicting the future, but an attempt to consider the 
possible outcomes of current practices and to 
anticipate potential opportunities and challenges. It 
is argued that, although megatrends may have a big 
influence on the future, the impact they have on 
particular times, places and practices will depend 
on a number of other factors. In the addition to the 
contingencies created when global forces and 
regional histories and conditions meet, agents also 
have choices over if and how they respond to each 
of these megatrends and their cumulative effects.  
 
What follows is a review of the social, 
technological, economic, environmental and 
political megatrends that are projected to have far-
reaching impacts on the Black Country. 
 
  
 SOCIAL 
3.1. In 2050 the world’s population will be larger, 
more urban and older than today.  Change will 
progress unevenly across regions.  Diverging trends 
will present different challenges to different 
regions. Significant changes in labour and social 
welfare patterns are expected. Relatively low 
income countries will be faced with demands to 
provide infrastructure and opportunities for their 
young and growing populations. Relatively high 
income countries, faced with increasing age 
dependency ratios, will need to consider the 
sustainability of existing systems of production and 
care, but also the relationship that could and should 
exist between the production and reproduction of 
society. 
 
Diverging Global Population 
Trends 
3.2. It is projected that the world's population will 
continue to increase, albeit at a slower rate. 
Today’s global population of nearly 7.6 billion is 
expected to reach 8.6 billion in 2030, 9.8 billion by 
2050 and 11.2 billion by 2100
17
. The world's 
population is ageing. In 1950, 8% of the world's 
population was aged 60 years or more. It is 
projected that in 2050, with the exception of Africa, 
nearly a quarter of the world's population will be 
aged 60 years or more
18
. Globally, life expectancy 
at birth is expected to increase (71 in 2010-2015 to 
77 in 2045-50). Global fertility is expected to fall 
from 2.5 births per woman in 2010/15 to 2.4 in 
2025/30 and 2 in 2095/00
19
.  
 
These headline figures hide significant regional 
differences in demographic trajectories. Europe is 
expected to have a smaller population in 2050 than 
today
20
.  Young and growing populations in 
relatively low income countries, contrast with 
ageing and stalling populations in relatively high 
income countries. Diverging population trends 
present very different problems and opportunities 
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 to particular jurisdictions. Projections of old-age 
dependency ratios, defined as the number of people 
aged over 65 as a percentage of those aged between 
15 and 64, suggest notable increases in India, 
Brazil and China. Ageing populations and 
subsequent demands for health, care and welfare 
services will put pressure on budgets at a time 
when working age populations, and related tax 
revenues, could be reduced. It is also expected that 
the meaning and representation of ageing will 
change within this new demographic context. In 
contrast, younger and growing populations will 
need to be fed, housed, educated and employed. An 
increasing supply of labour may also outstrip 
demand for jobs, particularly for those with 
university-level education. Such unequal 
developments are likely to increase the push and 
pull factors for migration for various countries
21
.  
 
Urbanisation and Megacities 
3.3. By 2050, it is projected that 67% of the world’s 
population will be living in cities. Today, 50% of 
the world's population lives in cities. In the 1950s it 
was less than 30% of the world's population
22
.  
 
It is anticipated that large scale migrations from 
rural areas into fast growing urban areas of Asia 
and Africa will drive much of this growth. The 
growth in the number and size of megacities, and 
their relative economic and social power, could 
rival the power of national governments. 
Megaprojects will be required to meet the 
economic and social needs and demands of these 
megacities
23
. 
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 TECHNOLOGY 
4.1. Innovations in technology are expected to be a 
disruptive force in social political and economic 
relations. A fourth industrial revolution, that 
redraws the lines between physical, digital, and 
biological domains, is anticipated. Technology is 
likely to develop in advance of policies and 
regulations. The risks and rewards of technology 
are unlikely to be spread evenly unless anticipatory 
action is taken. The role that technologies can and 
should play in society is yet to be determined. 
Public debates and conflict over the uses and 
abuses of technology and how best to respond to 
new risks and opportunities are likely to be 
heightened as the scope and potential of technology 
increases. 
 
A Fourth Industrial Revolution 
4.2. It is anticipated that developments in genetics, 
nanotechnology, biotechnology, artificial 
intelligence, robotics, graphene and additive 
manufacturing (3D printing) will generate a fourth 
industrial revolution
24
.  Industrial revolution 4.0 is 
expected to supersede the digital revolution and is 
characterised by a synthesis of technologies that 
redraws the lines between the physical, digital, and 
biological domains
25
.  
 
A new generation of machines will be thinking, 
sensing, moving, learning and acting 
autonomously. Developments in machine learning 
and robotics mean that these new technologies will 
be able to operate across a much wider part of the 
skill spectrum than previous forms of technology
26
. 
The potential to substitute for human brains as well 
as hands
27
 suggests that a technologically driven 
but uneven growth in productivity will continue to 
reshape the role and nature of work
28
. While the 
anticipated developments in technology will offer 
new opportunities, it is also expected that there will 
be disruptions to existing labour markets and 
systems of social welfare
29
.  
 
Estimates on the impact of new technologies on the 
labour market differ with regard to the number of 
jobs subject to automation and the number of new 
jobs to be created through developments in 
robotics, and artificial intelligence
30
.  
 
Frey and Osborne estimate that almost 1 in 2 jobs 
could be performed by computers and algorithms 
within the next 10 to 20 years. This equates to up 
80 million jobs in the U.S.A. and up to 15 million 
jobs in the U.K. at the risk of automation
31
. 
 
In contrast, Arntz, Gregory and Zierahn suggest 
that in industrialised nations 9 % of jobs are 
expected to disappear in the future due to 
automation, digitization, and robotics
32
. With 
respect to the UK, projections of up to 30% of 
existing jobs being lost due to automation needs to 
be set against the potential of AI-related 
technologies to boost productivity and generate 
additional jobs elsewhere in the economy
33
.  
 
The breadth of skills and functions afforded by 
these new technologies means that the impact of 
automation is likely to be felt across all sectors
34
. 
However, it is anticipated that social, creative and 
critical thinking skills will be relatively less subject 
to automation, whereas manual and routine tasks 
will be most susceptible to automation
35
.  
 
The likelihood of automation appears lowest in 
education, health and social work, and highest in 
sectors such as manufacturing, retail, transport and 
storage. It is projected that those most at risk from 
automation tend, on average, to have the lowest 
wage and further widen income disparities
36
. The 
projected uneven impact of technologies across 
different sectors will have implications for the role 
of technologies in shaping wider social and 
political relations. 
 
Bio-technologies 
4.3. Developments in biotechnology have the 
potential to improve the global food supply and 
human health
37
. Genetic engineering and 
biotechnologies promise improved diagnostics and 
treatments in efforts prevent diseases.  Nano 
technologies are expected to have a range of 
medical applications, including nanoscale 
diagnostics, and advanced drug delivery
38
.   
  
The line between natural and enhanced human 
performance will be blurred as functions such as 
strength, vision, hearing and memory are enhanced 
by advances in biology, pharmacology, cognitive 
science and communications
40
. Inequities in access 
to such technologies have the potential to increase 
inequalities further, as those able to adopt such 
enhancements increase their performance. 
 
Concerns over access, ethics, and the unforeseen 
consequences of biotechnologies, regardless of 
their potential benefits, will attract political 
opposition. It is likely that legal and regulatory 
frameworks will struggle to keep up with the 
exponential development of these technologies
41
. 
 
 
Bespoke Services or Surveillance 
Regimes 
4.4. The ‘Internet of Things’, that is, the number of, 
monitoring and sensing devices linked to the 
internet, will become cheaper, more widespread 
and part of everyday life.  Devices such as mobile 
phones, cars and household appliances, will be 
capable of collating and sharing vast amounts of 
data. In 2000, 25% of the world’s information was 
stored digitally. In 2014 it is more than 98%. It is 
currently projected that by 2045 there will be 
20,000 times more digital information than there is 
today
42
. 
 
Employment shares and the estimated proportion of jobs at potential high risk of automation by early 
2030s for all UK industry sectors. Source Adapted from 
39 
Industry Employment share of total 
jobs 
% at potential high risk 
Water, sewage and waste management 0.6 62.6 
Transportation and support services 4.9 56.4 
Manufacturing 7.6 46.4 
Wholesale and retail trade 14.8 44 
Administrative and Support Services 8.4 37.4 
Financial and insurance 3.2 32.2 
Public Administration and defence 4.3 32.1 
Electricity and gas supply  0.4 31.8 
Real estate 1.7 28.2 
Information and communication 4.1 27.3 
Professional, scientific and technical 8.8 25.6 
Accommodation and food services 6.7 25.5 
Construction 6.4 23.7 
Mining and quarrying 0.2 23.1 
Arts and entertainment 2.9 22.3 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 1.1 18.7 
Other services 2.7 18.6 
Human health and social work 12.4 17.0 
Education 8.7 8.5 
Domestic personnel and self-subsistence 0.3 8.1 
Total for all sectors  100 30 
 The growth in the volume and speed of access to 
data enabled by these new technologies generates a 
number of opportunities, but also presents a range 
of challenges to existing institutions, relations and 
practices
43
. 
 
 
Institutions will potentially have unprecedented 
opportunities to monitor individual's behaviour in 
order to anticipate needs, preferences and 
behaviours. Technology could bring benefits as 
new of forms of digital governance promise the 
ability to anticipate and respond to individual 
needs. The same technologies may also raise 
concerns as they are framed as part of the growth of 
a surveillance state.  
 
Growth in volume of digitally stored 
information 
 Exabyte of data* 
2005 132 
2015 8,251 
2025 213,381 
2035 6,1721,27 
2045 178,531,657 
*Exabyte is a billion gigabytes 
Source: Adapted from 
42
 
 
 
Policies and practices will need to develop in order 
to address the conflicting pressures and tensions 
between balancing privacy, convenience and 
security.  The line between what is socially, legally, 
and ethically acceptable and what is technically 
possible will be tested and possibly redrawn and 
will have far-reaching consequences for social, 
political and economic relations
44
.  
Number of connected devices per person 
2003 0.08 
2010 1.81 
2013 2.79 
2015 3.41 
2020 5.18 
2040 10.22 
Source: Adapted from 
42
 
 ECONOMY 
5.1. Asia is set to become the world’s economic 
centre of gravity, in what is projected to be a 
rebalancing of global economies. Economic growth 
is projected to help achieve reductions in global 
poverty, but based on current trends, will also be 
linked to growing inequality and escalating 
environmental pressures. The costs and benefits of 
globalisation will become increasingly visible and 
opposition vocal. It is anticipated that industrial 
revolution 4.0 will disrupt existing relations and 
potentially provide, and or require, different routes 
and ideas of progress. 
 
Globalisation and Growth 
5.2. Global economic output is projected to treble 
between 2010 and 2050
45
. Economic growth is 
projected to help achieve reductions in global 
poverty and increases in well-being, but based on 
current trends, will also be linked to growing 
inequality
46
 and escalating environmental 
pressures
47
.   
 
It is anticipated that the costs and benefits of 
globalisation will become increasingly visible and 
given the uneven distribution of the benefits, 
opposition will become more vocal. Despite 
periodic and intensified calls for protectionism and 
alternative economies, over the long term, it is 
anticipated that markets will continue across de-
regulated and open economies
48
.  
 
Notably, markets are likely to operate across a 
variety of regimes, with varying degrees of 
liberalism and state activism, reflecting the 
historical and political contingencies of particular 
jurisdictions
49
. 
 
New Centre of Gravity 
5.3. The epicentre of global growth is shifting. It is 
projected that China will have the largest economy, 
surpassing that of the United States, a few years 
before 2030.  In what is projected to be a 
rebalancing of global economies, it is anticipated 
that the economic centre of gravity will move 
towards Asia, with significant growth in a number 
emerging markets in Asia and Africa
5051
.  
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economies are rapidly increasing their share of 
global economic output, trade and investment. 
India and China have already doubled per capita 
income much faster than much smaller emerging 
economies in the past
52
. Relatively high income 
countries will continue to be confronted with 
shrinking workforces
53
 and stalled or diminishing 
productivity.  For the first time, a majority of the 
world’s population will be deemed middle class54. 
Asia is expected to account for the largest share of 
the global middle-class and middle-class 
consumption
55
.  
 
 
It is anticipated that the e7 economies will 
transition from centres of labour and production to 
increasingly consumption- oriented economies. The 
new middle classes are projected to hold increasing 
social, economic and political influence. Industrial 
Revolution 4.0 (See Technological megatrend) may 
present emerging market economies with ‘leapfrog’ 
opportunities as they seek to not only capitalize on 
new and changing technologies and markets, but 
take a different route to 'development'. 
 
Government Finances 
5.4. It is projected that increased cost competition 
among firms and fiscal competition among states 
will relatively diminish the capacity of states to 
manage the economy
56
. A politics of public debt 
will be heightened and contested as across the 
globe a number of national economies are facing 
the prospect of increasing governmental debt
57
. 
Based on current policies governing taxes and 
spending, countries such as the USA, UK and 
                                                 
1
 e7 = China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia 
and Turkey 
South Korea face steadily increasing debt over the 
next 30 years
58
. Governments will face increasing 
challenges in attempts to provide equality, security 
and prosperity. The social contracts that could and 
should exist between states and citizens will be 
contested, with attempts being made to redraw the 
lines and locus of responsibility and risk
59
. 
 
Measures of Success 
5.5. It is anticipated that pressure to develop and 
use additional or alternatives measures of wealth 
and welfare to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) will 
increase. As the costs and limitations of a narrow 
focus on economic growth become evident, debates 
regarding the development and use of alternative 
indices for measuring success and articulating goals 
will be extended and intensified. Drawing on the 
work of the EU's Beyond GDP initiative, the 
Commission on the Measurement of Economic 
Performance and Social Progress, the OECD Better 
Life Index and the United Nations Human 
Development Index, new metrics will seek to 
reflect the multiple factors that enhance and detract 
a society’s welfare and quality of life60.  
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 ENVIRONMENT 
6.1. It is projected that climate change and an 
increased demand and competition for resources 
will place increasing pressure on the planet's 
ecosystems. Tensions over climate change will 
grow as extreme weather, soil stress, and food and 
water insecurity disrupt societies. Changes in the 
environment have the potential to slow economic 
growth and pose a risk to human welfare and 
security. Limiting and mitigating the risks resulting 
from climate change will require substantial and 
sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions 
and the development of sustainable solutions to 
increased demands on the planet's resources. 
 
Climate Change 
6.2. It is projected that cumulative emissions of 
greenhouse gases will cause further warming and 
have long-lasting consequences across the climate 
system. The risks of abrupt or irreversible changes 
increase as the magnitude of warming increases.  
In the development of climate change projections 
the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
describe four Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCPs)
61
.  
 
The pathways include a stringent mitigation 
scenario (RCP2.6), that aims to keep global 
warming below a 2°C increase above pre-industrial 
temperatures, two intermediate scenarios (RCP4.5 
and RCP6.0), and one scenario with very high 
greenhouse gas emissions (RCP8.5). 
 
Across all these pathway scenarios, global mean 
surface temperatures and sea levels are projected to 
rise during the course of the 21st century. Oceans 
are expected to continue to warm and acidify. It is 
estimated that in many regions extreme 
precipitation events will become more frequent and 
intense and heat waves will occur more often and 
last longer. Climate change is expected to 
increasingly threaten natural ecosystems and 
biodiversity. Exacerbated by climate change and 
Projected change in global mean surface temperature and global mean sea level rise for the mid- 
and late 21st century, relative to the 1986-2005 period 
 2046-2065 2081 - 2100 
 Scenario Mean Likely range Mean Likely range 
 
Global Mean 
Surface 
Temperature 
Change (Degrees 
Celsius) 
RCP2.6 1.0 0.4 to 1.6 1.0 0.3 to 1.7 
RCP4.5 1.4 0.9 to 2.0 1.8 1.1 to 2.6 
RCP6.0 1.3 0.8 to 1.8 2.2 1.4 to 3.1 
RCP8.5 2.0 1.4 to 2.6 3.7 2.6 to 4.8  
 Scenario Mean Likely range Mean Likely range 
 
Global Mean Sea 
Level Rise (m) 
RCP2.6 0.24 0.17 to 0.32 0.40 0.26 to 0.55 
RCP4.5 0.26 0.19 to 0.33 0.47 0.32 to 0.63 
RCP6.0 0.25 0.18 to 0.32 0.48 0.33 to 0.63 
RCP8.5 0.30 0.22 to 0.38 0.63 0.45 to 0.82  
Source: Adapted from 
61
 
 pollution, rates of global habitat destruction and 
biodiversity loss are projected to increase and erode 
global water and food security. The effects of 
continued ecosystem degradation on poverty may 
lead to increased political instability and intra and 
inter country migration
62
.   
 
Competition for Resources 
6.3. Based on current trends, an increase in 
population growth that includes the levels of 
production and consumption found in high income 
countries today will be extremely problematic for 
the environment
63
. By 2030, with a projected 
population of 8.6 billion people, the world will 
need
64
: 
• 50% more energy. 
• 40% more water. 
• 35% more food.  
 
Global use of material resources is set to double by 
2030
65
. It is anticipated that this will increase the 
likelihood of pervasive and irreversible impacts on 
people and the ecosystems on which they depend
66
. 
A growing population combined with increased per 
capita consumption, is expected to increase 
competition and jeopardise access to vital 
resources
67
  
 
The uneven geographical distribution of resources 
could further increase price volatility, undermine 
living standards and heighten geopolitical 
conflict
68
. This is not grounds for prescribing a 
halting of development for some, so that others can 
maintain unsustainable lifestyles. Rather, it 
highlights the importance of identifying sustainable 
opportunities for all. Therefore it is not population 
growth per se that is the issue but the level of 
consumption commensurate with such growth
69
.  
 
Calls for Action  
6.4. Risks are unevenly distributed. Generally, the 
risks are increased for disadvantaged communities 
in countries at all levels of development
70
.  It is 
anticipated that concerns over climate change, 
whether observed or anticipated will foster 
increased demands to take action on climate 
change. The urgency of the demands for action will 
vary across regions
71
. Increasing pressure is likely 
to come from those countries currently most at risk 
from the effects of climate change but the least 
responsible for current emissions
72
.  
 
The political voice of such countries to take action 
on and in response to climate change will become 
louder in a multi-polar and polycentric world
73
  
Notably, even if the anthropogenic emissions of 
greenhouse gases are stopped, it is projected that 
many aspects of climate change and its associated 
impacts will continue for centuries
74
.  
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Near term (2030-2040)
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Increased damages from extreme heat events 
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 POLITICS 
7.1. Governing will get harder. The emergence of a 
multipolar geopolitical landscape will complicate 
efforts to secure multilateral agreements. A shift in 
global politics may be overshadowed by a more 
fundamental shift in the nature of power. Enabled 
by communication technologies, power will shift 
toward extended, resourceful and diffuse networks. 
Securing and sustaining agreement on global, 
national and regional issues will require a rethink 
on the nature and exercise of power and 
accountability. For those seeking to develop and 
enact strategies, difficulties in setting and 
communicating agreed narratives around a common 
interest, will further complicate the realisation of 
such strategies. Networks and coalitions will 
become increasingly vital in a multipolar world. 
 
Multi-Polar Politics 
7.2. The global power index is based upon GDP, 
population size, military spending, and levels of 
technology, health, education, and governance
75
.  
Reversing the historic rise of the West since 1750, 
by 2030 it is estimated that Asia will have 
surpassed North America and Europe in terms of 
global power. 
 
The economies of Europe, Japan, and Russia are 
likely to continue their slow, relative declines. In 
contrast, countries such as Colombia, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Iran, South Africa, Mexico and Turkey, 
will not necessarily exhibit the influence of China 
and India, but the aggregate power of such states 
may overtake that of western industrialised states, 
by 2030.  
 
It is anticipated that international institutions will 
still be have a role to play, but will find it difficult 
to adapt to a more multipolar, changing, and 
complex environment
76
. Sustaining multilateral 
responses to a range of social, political, economic 
and environmental issues, though vital, will 
become harder to agree and sustain.  
 
Dissipation of Power 
7.3. The State is expected to continue to remain the 
dominant political actor, but one subject to a 
number of challenges
77
. Publics will demand 
governments’ deliver security and prosperity. 
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 However, flat revenues, distrust, and a 
pluralisation, if not polarization, of politics will 
create a number of challenges for politicians and 
policymakers. The tension between the wicked 
problems
78
 facing society and governments’ 
willingness and capacity to address such issues will 
be exacerbated
79
. Complicating matters is the 
expectation that there will be an increase in the 
number and a capacity of agents who can block or 
circumvent social, political and economic 
relations
80
. 
 
Governments will have to deal with an increasing 
number of political actors
81
. For profit and not for 
profit institutions will continue to seek to 
collaborate and compete with governments in the 
provision of goods and services. This will raise 
questions about the accountability and transparency 
of non-state actors. An increase in the number and 
diversity of institutions attempting and claiming to 
represent constituencies to authorities is 
anticipated
82
. The capacity afforded by new 
technologies, will increase the likelihood of 
religious based institutions, community groups, 
single issue pressure groups and city mayors to 
build their own constituencies and coalitions. This 
will further complicate forms of governance
83
.  
 
Advances in global education and technology will 
continue to have the potential to empower 
individuals and lead to increased demands for 
transparency and participation in government 
decision-making
84
. Networks and coalitions will 
have the potential to innovate, lever resources and 
play a vital role in addressing a number of global 
and local challenges. 
 
A plurality of perspectives and a fragmentation of 
public discourses, reflected in notions of echo 
chambers and filter bubbles will hinder the efforts 
of agents to create and sustain shared 
understandings
85
. Difficulties in forging consensus 
across a myriad of positions, along with an 
enhanced ability of small groups to veto, block and 
disrupt relations, will make collaboration 
agreements and actions difficult.  
 
It is projected that raised public expectations, 
reduced levels of trust and the constrained capacity 
of governments will lead to continued attempts to 
redefine, reconfigure and reproduce the ‘rights and 
responsibilities’ of different agencies, both as 
institutions and individuals. 
  
 CONCLUSION 
8.1. The report, ‘Global Megatrends and the Black 
Country’ provides a review of some of the latest 
data, trends and thinking on global megatrends. 
Megatrends occur at the intersection of many trends 
and represent projected changes in social, political 
and economic relations. Megatrends have the 
potential to significantly change the way people 
live. Attempts to anticipate megatrends enable 
foresight into the risk, rewards and responsibilities 
that the future may hold. The scope of the report is 
global and as such seeks to extend both the 
temporal and spatial boundaries of what are 
considered opportunities, challenges and 
responsibilities for those living in the Black 
Country today. The report does not predict the 
future, but represents a set of projections intended 
to stimulate thinking, extend conversations and 
inform actions as to how the futures of the Black 
Country could and should be shaped. 
 
Three Cs 
8.2. Cutting across the STEEP megatrends, it is 
anticipated that the future global context of the 
Black Country is to be characterised by: 
 
Contrasts: Diverging demographic trends and 
growing inequalities will mean stark differences in 
what the future holds and how it is experienced 
both within and across national states and regions. 
The costs and benefits of globalisation will become 
increasingly visible and debates on the performance 
and legitimacy of existing social, political and 
economic relations will become more vital.  
Connections: Relations between people, 
technology and the environment will be become 
more important and complex.  Extended work and 
social networks have the potential to play a vital 
role in addressing a number of global and local 
challenges. A growth in interconnectivity may also 
lead to more surveillance and disruption from the 
risks posed by climate change and political 
instability. 
Contests: Increases in global population and 
incomes will increase levels of consumption and 
competition over access to resources. The 
competition for resources, in a multi-polar world, is 
expected to heighten differences within and across 
countries and make efforts to create and sustain 
shared understandings and goals more difficult to 
achieve. 
 
A future of uneven developments, increased 
complexity and interdependency and heightened 
contradictions and uncertainty affords a number of 
risks, opportunities and challenges. Societies, 
states, institutions, communities and individuals, 
will need to continue to contend with a number of 
systemic challenges. Each jurisdiction and agent 
makes its own choices about how it could and 
should respond to these megatrends and the 
combination of relations and practices it uses to 
achieve its given ends.  
 
Future Orientation 
8.3. There is no one way to respond to the data and 
tendencies highlighted in this report, but it is 
argued that a response is necessary. When faced 
with change, agents can choose one of three broad 
positions, to be fatalistic, adaptable or 
transformative. 
 
 Fatalism is where outcomes are considered to 
be either pre-determined or not amenable to 
change by individuals. Therefore agents are left 
with little choice but to be subject to fate. 
 Adaptation is an attempt to find ways to fit in 
and perform with a new environment. If the 
new environment is predictable, then the 
adjustments that need to be made are clear. 
However, where the future is uncertain and 
changing, adaption becomes a constant process, 
where responsiveness and flexibility are valued 
qualities. 
 Transformation seeks to shape global and 
regional change in ways that not only mitigate 
and manage risks but create new conditions, 
relations and practices. Transformative 
approaches do not accept trends as inevitable, 
but make efforts to tackle and redirect the 
drivers of change. Transformative approaches 
can seek to create new worlds, or in some 
instances, seek to return to a lost golden age. 
 
The choice of orientation will in part depend on the 
values, beliefs and capacity (perceived and actual) 
of the agents concerned. Arguably, in a world 
where surprises are considered to hit harder and 
more frequently, the most successful agents will be 
those that are adaptive and resilient. This enables 
agents to better respond to changing conditions, 
persevere in the face of adversity and act quickly to 
recover after mistakes. However, not everyone has 
the same opportunities and capacity for building 
resilience and adapting to change.  
 
If all of the Black Country is to thrive in the future, 
it may be necessary to go beyond enhancing 
agents’ tenacity and adaptability and to consider 
how broader social, political and economic 
relations and practices can be configured so that 
both the risks and benefits are shared. 
 Plural Futures 
8.4. The report is not an attempt to predict the 
future, where success is to be judged by the 
accuracy of forecasts against what actually happens 
in the future. Rather the report represents a set of 
projections intended to stimulate thinking, extend 
conversations and inform actions as to how the 
futures of the Black Country could and should be 
shaped. 
 
The question posed, is under what conditions will it 
be possible for all agents to have the opportunity to 
realise their futures? This is an audacious task and 
it is not a task that could or should be undertaken 
by any one agent or institution. Making sense of 
futures requires attempts to develop an 
understanding of the multiple perspectives of 
diverse organisations and communities.  
 
Orthodox strategic thinking suggests that the best 
way to address an issue and develop a strategy is to 
follow an orderly and linear process, working from 
the identification of goals and methods, through to 
the selection of means and their implementation. It 
is questionable as to whether such an orthodox 
approach to strategy is sufficient for responding to 
the degree of complexity, change and uncertainty 
that negotiating the future requires. Such orthodox 
strategies also tend to reflect and realise attempts to 
advance an agent’s existing interests and position 
over time. As reflected in this report, the Dial 481 
project does not seek to advantage any one group, 
or seek to establish a single and universal vantage 
point from which to survey the future. Instead, it is 
argued that proposals for possible futures require 
the involvement, commitment and coordination of 
multiple stakeholders to be enacted.  
 
The Black Country today has been shaped by the 
choices that have been made, both historically and 
globally. Futures will continue to be shaped by the 
accumulation and intersection of manifold 
decisions, relations and practices that reflect 
multiple interests and result in a web of intended 
and unintended consequences. In attempts to shape 
such futures, it is anticipated that a revision of the 
nature and operation of power and influence will be 
required. This is not to discount the force and 
influence of hard power, but to highlight how a 
growing interdependency means that attempts to 
secure stated goals will require an enhanced 
capacity to lever resources, sustain relationships, 
and share  information in a more rapid and flexible 
manner than has been evident to date.  
 
Where the ability to dominate constituencies or 
control the environment is diminished, openness to 
networked forms of governance and the 
management and facilitation of diverse and shifting 
alliances will be vital to achieving desired 
outcomes. The ability to tend to relationships and 
create webs of cooperation to the mutual benefit of 
stakeholders will be vital. To this end, the ability to 
create evocative narratives and cultivate trust and 
credibility will be essential to the identification and 
sharing of overlapping, but not identical, interests 
and values.  
 
When the need for collaborative working will be 
most vital, the prevailing tendencies that can 
undermine such efforts need to be noted. The 
power of individuals and groups to block outcomes 
will be much easier that efforts to co-operate and 
forge new policies and practices. This should not be 
taken to deter efforts to join and develop coalitions 
for change, but to highlight the challenges and 
value of those institutions and individuals most 
capable of identifying and taking advantage of 
opportunities to work cooperatively.  
 
Next Steps 
8.5. In a context of increased and diverse 
viewpoints and interests, the future potentially 
provides a shared point of orientation. The future is 
something that we all share, even if we don't all 
agree on what the future should be.  The aim of this 
report has been to enable discussions both within 
and across institutions and communities in and 
beyond the Black Country as to how to respond and 
shape futures for all. This is considered the 
beginning of ongoing efforts to share assessments 
of current tendencies and inform debates, plans and 
actions that anticipate the risks, opportunities and 
responsibilities of today and tomorrow.  
 
The Dial 481 project does not seek to establish 
what should be done, but rather, to further develop 
an understanding of how we could attend to the 
future. This includes efforts to: 
 Close the distance and tension between 
relatively short term political and commercial 
time horizons and the requirement to consider 
long term plans and actions;  
 Identify and challenge assumptions over the 
nature and scope of actions that could be taken 
by individuals and agencies, and;  
 Identify and address differences in values over 
what the future should be and the means by 
which particular futures can be achieved.  
In sum, engaging with futures is not a struggle 
between advocates of the real and the possible, but 
to ask what we take to be real and what is really 
possible? 
 Global Megatrends and the Black Country  
Note on methods 
9.1. Exploring the Future - The following stages were completed in the 
production of Global Megatrends and the Black Country. 
Stage I Identify and review data, trends, forecasts and projections 
produced by national and multinational institutions. United 
Nations Specialised Agencies, World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, IMF; World Health Organisation, WHO; 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
UNESCO; International Labour Organisation, ILO; Food and 
Agriculture Organization, FAO; International Fund for 
Agricultural Development, IFAD; United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization, UNIDO. The World Trade 
Organisation, WTO; Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, OECD; International Panel on Climate 
Change, IPCC; World Economic Forum, WEF; and; National 
Governments’ Foresight Projects and Independent Fiscal 
Councils. 
Stage II Identify and review megatrends reports produced by state, 
commercial and non-governmental organisations, e.g. National 
Intelligence Council, USA; European Environment Agency, 
Ministry of Defence, UK, CSIRO, Australia, EY and KPMG. 
Stage III Concepts and themes identified in stages one and two are used to 
inform a literature review of academic literature using the Web of 
Science database. 
Stage IV Categorise megatrends within STEEP (Social, Technological, 
Economic, Environmental and Political) framework. 
Stage V Identify cross cutting themes and issues of relevance to a particular 
constituency – Black Country. 
Suggested citation: Connor, S. (2017) Global Megatrends and the Black 
Country. Wolverhampton: The Dial 481 project / University of 
Wolverhampton. 
  
 THE DIAL 481 PROJECT 
What does the future hold? It may not be possible to know the future, 
but it is possible to explore futures in clear, rigorous and creative ways in 
order to anticipate potential risks and opportunities. The Dial 481 
project works with individuals, groups and institutions to bring future 
orientated approaches to life on real projects. The Dial 481 project uses 
EVE, a framework designed to Explore, View and Educe futures.  
 
EXPLORE – to travel through an unfamiliar area, to learn, inquire or discuss a subject in detail.  
A key challenge when thinking about futures is the sheer volume of sources and information 
available. The Dial 481 project reviews and helps make sense of the latest data and reports on the 
most important issues, trends and tendencies.   
 
VIEW – to inspect, look and see something, or to be seen, from a particular place. 
The Dial 481 project helps people view the implications of their futures and the assumptions and 
interests that inform particular views of the future. A range of methods are used to enhance an 
understanding of change and the mechanisms underlying events and the shaping of futures. 
 
EDUCE – to bring out something latent or develop potential. 
Anticipating possible futures and identifying and prioritising potential challenges and opportunities 
are essential to informed and effective decision making. The Dial 481 project uses futures to design 
and test prototype policies and practices to inform the development and implementation of strategies 
that anticipate and realise preferred futures. 
 
Every day individuals, groups, institutions and governments anticipate and act towards the future. The 
Dial 481 project aims to build on and extend such everyday sense making in order to inform and 
support future debates, policies and practices. 
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